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LEARNING  IN  HIGH  STAKES  ULTIMATUM  GAMES: 
AN  EXPERIMENT  IN  THE  SLOVAK  REPUBLIC 
BY  ROBERT  SLONIM AND ALVIN  E.  ROTH I 
This paper reports an experiment involving an ultimatum bargaining game, played in 
the  Slovak Republic.  Financial stakes were  varied by a factor of  25, and behavior was 
observed both when players were inexperienced and as they gained experience. Consistent 
with prior results, changes  in stakes  had only a small effect  on  play for  inexperienced 
players. But the present experimental design allows us to observe that rejections were less 
frequent the higher the stakes, and proposals in the high stakes conditions declined slowly 
as  subjects  gained  experience.  This  Slovak  experiment  is  the  first  to  detect  a  lower 
frequency of  rejection when  stakes are higher and this can be  explained by the  added 
power due to  multiple observations per subject in the  experimental design. A  model  of 
learning suggests that the lower rejection frequency is the reason that the proposers in the 
higher stakes conditions of the ultimatum game learn to make lower offers. 
KEYWORDS:  Bargaining games, experimental design, learning. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
One  of  the  conventions  which  has  come  to  distinguish  experimental  eco- 
nomics  from experimental  psychology is  that  economics  experiments  typically 
attempt  to  control  subjects'  incentives  by  using  monetary  payoffs  based  on 
performance.2 It is thus natural that one of the most frequent questions about 
experimental  economics  concerns  whether  behavior  observed when  monetary 
incentives  are relatively low can  be  generalized  to  similar environments with 
much higher risks and rewards. One way to address this is by within-experiment 
comparisons of behavior under widely different financial incentives, holding all 
else  constant. The wider the range of payoffs the more powerful is the experi- 
ment at detecting potential differences in behavior that might be due to the size 
of the incentives. It is therefore  attractive to conduct experiments in countries 
where  the  wage  levels  are  relatively low,  so  that  subjects can  be  given  large 
financial incentives with a given experimental budget. 
'This work was partially supported by NSF Grant SES-9121968 to the  University of Pittsburgh. 
We  also  thank Ido Erev, Nick Feltovich,  Ellen  Garbarino, Marjorie McElroy, and Jean-Francois 
Richard for helpful advice, and Alena  Kimakova, Martin Mrva, and Gabriel Sipos for assistance in 
running the Slovak experiment. The current version of the paper reflects the contributions of several 
anonymous referees. 
2See  Roth  (1995a)  on  the  history  of  experimental  economics,  and  the  origin  of  monetary 
payments  in  economics  experiments,  starting with  the  critique  by  W.  Allen  Wallis  and  Milton 
Friedman (1942) of the experiment reported by L. L. Thurstone (1931). 
3A number of experiments have adopted this approach, e.g., in India (Binswanger (1980)), China 
(Kachelmeier  and Shehata (1992)), Russia (Fehr  and Tougareva (1995)), and Indonesia (Cameron 
(1995)).  Another  approach is  to  look  for  naturally occurring economic  environments  resembling 
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The present study reports an experiment conducted in the Slovak Republic in 
1994, concerning  how  financial  incentives  influence  observed  behavior  in  an 
ultimatum bargaining game,  a game  that  has  an  extreme  perfect  equilibrium 
that predicts that one  side  of  the  market will receive  essentially  none  of  the 
wealth. The stakes were varied by a factor of 25, from 60 Slovak Crowns (Sk) to 
1500, with  an  intermediate  stakes  condition  of  300  Sk. The  smallest  stakes 
condition (60 Sk) was chosen  because  it is similar to the experimental rewards 
per hour subjects get in experiments run in the U.S., where the stakes are often 
between 2 and 3 hours of wages. Subjects in the 60, 300, and 1500 sessions were 
bargaining over approximately 2.5, 12.5, and 62.5 hours of wages, respectively. 
The  average  monthly wage  rate  in  the  Slovak Republic  at  the  time  of  the 
experiment was 5500 Sk.4 
The  ultimatum game consists  of  two players bargaining over an amount of 
money  which  we  will  call  the  "pie."  One  player,  the  proposer,  proposes  a 
division of the pie, and the second player, the responder, accepts or rejects it. If 
the responder accepts, each player earns the amount specified in the proposal, 
and if the responder rejects, each player earns zero. At perfect equilibrium the 
proposer receives all or almost all of the pie. 
The  ultimatum game has received  a great deal of  attention  since  the  initial 
experiment  by Guth,  Schmittberger, and  Schwartz (1982).  It was  studied,  to- 
gether  with  a  related  market  game,  under  controlled  conditions  in  a  four 
country experiment by Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Zamir (1991). The 
game was played in ways that allowed the players to gain experience,  and the 
play of the game revealed effects  of experience; but behavior robustly showed 
no  signs  of  approaching the  perfect  equilibrium. Furthermore,  the  observed 
transactions were  most  similar in  the  four  subject pools  when  subjects were 
inexperienced, and became  dissimilar in the  different subject pools  as subjects 
gained  experience.  Roth  and  Erev  (1995)  show  that  these  observations  are 
consistent  with  a  simple  model  of  learning. In the  learning model,  as  in  the 
experiment,  small  initial  differences  between  subject pools  become  larger as 
subjects gain experience with the ultimatum game. 
those whose robustness to higher stakes is of interest. This has the advantage of allowing truly high 
stakes to be examined, at the cost of losing the control available in the lab, and so allowing factors 
other than changes in stakes to influence the results. In this spirit, Telser (1995) identifies an aspect 
of salaiy  negotiations  in major league  baseball as a high stakes analogue  of the  ultimatum game. 
Several investigators have looked to TV game shows for data. For example, Gertner (1993) studies 
risk attitudes on  the  game  show  Car-d  Sharks, Metric (1995)  investigates bidding behavior on  the 
game  show  Jeopar-dy,  and  Berk,  Hughson,  and  Vandezande  (1996)  study learning  and  bounded 
rationality on the game show The Price is Riglit. 
Statistics were unavailable on student wages. The 20 to 30 Sk per hour average student wage rate 
came from personal observation. In terms of purchasing power, for example, a dormitoiy room cost 
150 Sk per month, a monthly bus pass cost 80 Sk, a local phone call cost 2 Sk for 6 minutes, and a 
movie cost 24 Sk. The exchange rate was 31 Sk for $1; thus the stakes were $1.9, $9.7, and $48.4 for 
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The  design of the present experiment takes advantage of this observation to 
increase the power of the  experiment to detect  differences  in behavior due to 
differences  in  stakes.  Unlike  previous  high  stakes  experiments,  the  present 
experiment will give subjects an opportunity to  play the  game  multiple  times 
(with different partners) so that the effects of learning-which  may magnify the 
effects of high stakes  can be observed. 
Higher financial stakes might matter for several reasons. High stakes might 
reduce responders' willingness to 'punish' a given disproportionate offer, since it 
would  raise  the  financial  cost  of  indulging in  such  behavior.  Likewise,  high 
stakes might cause proposers to make proportionally less fair (smaller) offers to 
responders because  higher stakes will raise the financial cost  to make propor- 
tionally fairer offers. Also, proposers might make smaller proportional offers if 
they  believe  responders  are  more  likely  to  accept  a  given  disproportionate 
offer.5 Hence, high stakes might move behavior towards the perfect equilibrium. 
Controlled  experiments reporting within-experiment comparisons of  ultima- 
tum games played for different stakes have generally found little effect on either 
offers  or rejection frequencies.  Roth  et  al. (1991) examined games played for 
$10 and for $30, and noticed  no  important difference.  Straub and Murnighan 
(1995) also found little difference in proposer or responder behavior in ultima- 
tum games between  $5 and $100.6 Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith (1996) found 
no significant difference in offers or rejection frequencies between $10 and $100 
stakes in ultimatum games with either  a random entitlement  or contest  treat- 
ment to  determine the  proposer. And  Cameron (1995) found no  difference  in 
either proposer or responder behavior when stakes were changed from 5,000 to 
200,000 Indonesian Rupiahs. 
Except  in  Roth  et  al. (1991)  (which considered  only  a  modest  variation in 
stakes),  subjects  in  the  experiments  described  above  had  no  opportunity  to 
obtain experience.7 The results of Roth et al. suggest that the ultimatum game is 
a  game  in  which  experience  serves  to  magnify  initially  small  differences  in 
behavior, and Roth and Erev (1995) present a learning model that predicts this. 
The current experiment therefore looks not only at a larger difference in stakes 
(a factor of 25) than has (with the exception of Cameron (1995)) previously been 
examined,  but  also  looks  at  the  effect  of  the  difference  as  subjects  gain 
experience. If the predictions of the learning model are correct, the interaction 
5However,  larger stakes may induce risk averse proposers to offer a greater share of the pie to 
avoid losing the greater monetary payoffs. 
6Straub  and Murnighan (1995)  found,  in their complete  information condition,  that the  mean 
(median) lowest acceptable offer was constant at approximately 20% (15%) of the financial stakes 
level for pies of $10 to $100, in which subjects might get paid. The mean (median) lowest acceptable 
offer  drops below  20% (15%) for stakes  of  $1,000 and $1,000,000 in hypothetical questions.  The 
mean (median) offer was constant at approximately 40% (50%) for stakes between  $5 and $80 and 
drops to about 35% (40%) for larger hypothetical stakes. 
7Hoffman et  al. (1996)  investigated  a one-shot  environment  in which subjects play one  game, 
Straub and Murnighan (1995) obtained multiple offers and minimum acceptable offers from every 
subject, but  subjects never  received  feedback  from  an  opponent,  and  Cameron's (1995)  subjects 
played two games, but with different stakes. 572  R.  SLONIM AND  A.  E.  ROTH 
of stakes and experience should increase the power of the experiment to detect 
difference in behavior due to differences in the financial incentives.8 
An additional advantage of having multiple (although nonindependent) obser- 
vations per subject, even in the absence of learning, is that we are able to more 
precisely measure  subtle  differences  in behavior caused by higher stakes. We 
find the rejections were less frequent the higher the stakes, and proposals in the 
high stakes  conditions  decline  as proposers gained  experience.  The  ability to 
detect  a significant difference  in rejection frequency across stakes, which had 
eluded previous experimenters, can be explained by the added power the current 
design provides. With the larger number of observations in the current design 
we are able to observe many slightly unequal proposals which are rejected only 
slightly less frequently when stakes are higher, and we are also able to observe a 
few very unequal proposals which are rejected much less frequently when stakes 
are  higher.  And  this  difference  in  rejection  frequencies,  together  with  the 
opportunity which the experiment provides for proposers to learn from experi- 
ence, allows us to detect differences in proposer behavior across stakes also. 
The  experimental  design  also  includes  sessions  studying the  market game 
examined by Roth et al. (1991). The market game consists of players simultane- 
ously making sealed bids for an indivisible object which has the same value to all 
players. The player who makes the highest bid earns the difference between the 
object's value  and  the  highest  bid, while  all  other  bidders  earn  zero.9  The 
perfect  equilibrium involves bidders bidding away all or almost all the wealth. 
Roth  et  al.  (1991)  observed  that  behavior  in  the  market  game,  unlike  the 
ultimatum game, robustly and quickly converged to the perfect  equilibrium as 
players gained experience. We included the market game sessions because high 
stakes could have a different effect on behavior in the two games; in the market 
game high stakes give bidders more incentive to try to  establish some  implicit 
cooperation to keep bids down. Thus high stakes might cause behavior to move 
less towards perfect equilibrium in the market game and more towards perfect 
equilibrium in the ultimatum game. However, in the market game we could not 
detect  any differences  due  to  stakes; in  all  stakes  conditions  the  transaction 
price  quickly went  to  and  remained  at  the  perfect  equilibrium. Because  the 
results are very similar to those reported in Roth et al. (1991), the market game 
results will not be discussed in further detail. 
8For  some  relevant review papers see  Guth and Tietz (1990), and Roth (1995b). The paper by 
Fudenberg and Levine (1997) explores a nuanced approach to the issue of learning as a function of 
the costs of "irrational" behavior. 
9See  Roth  et  al.  (1991)  for  a  detailed  description  of  the  market game.  The  current  market 
sessions  differ from Roth et  al. in that no experimental subject was assigned the role of seller. In 
Roth et al. one subject was the seller in each market, and could accept or reject the highest bid. (An 
active seller was used  to  control for fairness hypotheses  in comparisons between  the  market and 
ultimatum  games.)  However,  in  all  market games  in  all  sessions,  Roth  et  al.  found  the  seller 
accepted  every offer.  Hence  in this  experiment  all subjects are bidders, and the  highest  offer  is 
automatically accepted. (The absence of an active seller reduces the set of Nash equilibria, but not 
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The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the experimental design 
and equilibrium predictions for the ultimatum game, and Section 3 presents the 
experimental  results,  including  a  discussion  of  statistical  power  in  different 
experimental  designs.  Section  4  briefly  discusses  how  the  results  relate  to 
learning behavior, and Section 5 concludes. 
2.  EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN  AND  PERFECT  EQUILIBRIUM PREDICTIONS 
In  the  ultimatum game,  subjects participated  in  a  sequence  of  ten  games 
against different anonymous opponents.10 During the ten game session a subject 
learned  only  the  results  of  his  or  her  own  negotiations.  Each  subject  was 
randomly assigned to be a proposer or responder, and a subject played the same 
role throughout the ten game session. In all games the pie was 1000 points and 
proposed divisions could be made in units of 5 points (0, 5, 10,...  995, 1000). The 
exchange  rate  for  1000  points  was  60,  300,  or  1500  Slovak  Crowns  (Sk), 
depending on the session. Ten ultimatum sessions were conducted, three at 60 
Sk, four at 300 Sk, and three at 1500 Sk. 
The  subgame perfect  assumption (with the  additional assumption that  sub- 
jects  only want to maximize their monetary payoffs) means the  responder will 
accept any positive offer, since rejecting any positive offer is inconsistent with 
wanting to  maximize monetary reward. Since  the  smallest  positive  amount  a 
proposer can offer is 5 points, no proposer will offer more than 5 points because 
responder will surely accept that amount. Thus, two subgame perfect equilibria 
exist: in one, proposer offers responder 5 points and keeps 995 for himself, and 
responder accepts (but would have rejected an offer of 0 points). In the other, 
proposer offers responder 0 points and responder accepts.1" 
3.  EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
A  quick summary of  our results is that, consistent  with previous ultimatum 
game results (e.g., Straub and Murnigham (1995), Hoffmann et al. (1996), and 
Cameron (1995), we detect no significant difference between low and high stakes 
proposals or between low and high stakes rejection frequencies when examining 
inexperienced behavior (i.e., behavior in the first period). However, using all ten 
periods, we  observe  for  the  first time  that  responders  in  higher stakes  reject 
proportionally equivalent offers less  often,  although rejections still occur even 
when  substantial financial loss results. And when  learning is examined, stakes 
also  make  a  difference  for  proposals;  offers  decline  in  the  higher  stakes 
treatments  as proposers gain experience.  These  results are described in more 
detail next. 
'0See  Slonim (1995) for a complete description of the experimental design and procedures for the 
ultimatum sessions, which duplicate those described in Roth et al. (1991). 
1"  In addition, in the ultimatum game any price can be observed at an imperfect Nash equilibrium. 574  R.  SLONIM AND  A.  E.  ROTH 
TABLE I 
SUMMARY  OF ULTIMATUM  GAME 
Offers  and Rejections  by Range  of Offers  and Basic  Statistics 
60 Sk, N =24  300 Sk, N=  33  1500 Sk, N = 25 
Offer  Ranges  %Off  % Rej  % Off  % Rej  % Off  % Rej  #Offers 
> 500  6.3  6.7  6.7  4.5  7.2  0.0  55 
(15)  (1)  (22)  (1)  (18)  (0) 
=  500  28.7  0.0  21.5  1.4  30.8  1.3  217 
(69)  (0)  (71)  (1)  (77)  (1) 
450-495  21.7  9.6  22.7  5.3  6.0  0.0  142 
(52)  (5)  (75)  (4)  (15)  (0) 
400-445  24.6  23.7  21.8  12.5  32.4  4.9  212 
(59)  (14)  (72)  (9)  (81)  (4) 
350-395  11.3  40.7  9.4  9.7  5.2  0.0  71 
(27)  (11)  (31)  (3)  (13)  (0) 
300-345  4.6  45.5  10.6  22.9  7.2  11.1  64 
(11)  (5)  (35)  (8)  (18)  (2) 
250-295  2.5  66.7  3.9  30.8  3.2  37.5  27 
(6)  (4)  (13)  (4)  (8)  (3) 
< 250  0.4  100.0  3.3  90.9  8.0  60.0  32 
(1)  (1)  (11)  (10)  (20)  (12) 
All Offers  100.0  17.1  100.0  12.1  100.0  8.8  820 
(240)  (41)  (330)  (40)  (250)  (22) 
Offers <500  35.1  25.6  71.2  16.0  61.6  13.6  548 
(156)  (40)  (237)  (38)  (155)  (21) 
Average (all)  445  423  427 
Average  440  428  415 
(7 exclusions) 
Notes:  The  number  in parentheses  below  each  percenit offer  is the  number  of offers  made  in the  range  and the  number  in 
parentheses  below  percent  rejected  is  the  number  of  offers  rejected  in  the  range.  The  average  (7  exclusions)  removes  all 
offers  of the  six subjects  that made  more  than four offers  greater  than 50% and also  excludes  the one  subject  that made  the 
offer  of  .5% of the  pie  in every  round. 
Table I describes proposer and responder behavior aggregating across rounds, 
and the Appendix provides a complete list of all players' choices. Table I can be 
read  as  follows;  consider  the  offer  range  400-445,  which  signifies  proposer 
offered  responder between  40  and 44.5% of  the  pie.  In the  60  Sk condition, 
24.6% (59/240)  of  all offers were  in this  range, and 23.7% (14/59)  of  these 
offers were rejected. Similarly, offers in this range accounted for 21.8% of the 
offers in the  300 Sk condition  and 32.4% in the  1500 Sk condition,  and these 
offers  were  rejected  12.5% and  4.9%  of  the  time  in  the  300  and  1500  Sk 
conditions, respectively. 
3.1.  Responder  Behavior 
Overview: Over all offers, the rejection rate decreases from 17.1% (41/240) 
in the lowest stakes (60 Sk) to 12.1% (40/330)  and 8.8% (22/250)  in the middle 
(300  Sk)  and  highest  (1500  Sk) conditions,  respectively. For  disproportionate HIGH  STAKES ULTIMATUM GAMES  575 
offers, in which responders  are offered less than half the pie, the rejection  rate 
decreases  from 25.6% (40/156)  to  16.0% (38/237)  to  13.6% (21/155)  as the 
stakes increase. 
Figures la-lc  show rejection rates over time by offer range. The height of 
each bar shows  the percent  of offers rejected  for each period  for a specific  offer 
range. For example, in period nine 57% (4/7)  of offers were rejected in the 60 
Sk condition in the 400-445 offer range and in period ten 11% (1/9)  were 
rejected.  An empty  square  indicates  no offers were made in that cell and a bar 
with no depth indicates  offers were made but none were rejected.  For example, 
Ij0% 
n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~fe  Rangem 
g 
Period  Number  910 
60Sk: Rejections  I Offers_ 
Offer  Rans 
a5  r  r  r  m  - 
____  .495  445  -39  5  -345  -2  95  -245  ALL 
1  1/3  1110  111  0/0  0/0  0/0  3114 
2  1/6  2/  0/3  111  0/  01  4116 
3  0/3  2/5  1/3  0/1  0  /1 Il  4/14 
7  4  7  1/  1/2  0/0  7117 
Peuld  5  1/6  0/  0/  2/  2/  00  /15 
8  0/  /5  214  0/0  1/1  0/0  5/16 
7  :-0/4  04  2/3  _  /  0/  0/  212 
8  0/7  1/7  1/2  1/2  0/0  OR)  2/18 
9  20/5  4  1  0/1  010  0  5/16 
10  0/5  13  1/3  41  00  0/  2 18 
1-10  _  P5/52 14/5o  11/27  5/N1  4  111  40/156 
FIGURE lRaLow  stakes  (60 Sk). 576  R.  SLONIM AND  A.  E.  ROTH 
300  %  ...  Ree:insIOfr 
40% 
007 
_9  20%  350-395  Offer  Range  0%1 
Period Number  89  10 
300  8k: Rejections  /Offers 
Offer  Ranges 
450  400  350  300-  250  O 
-495  -445  -395  -345  -295  -245  ALL 
1  0/11  0/3  0/2  0/3  0/0  1/1  1/20 
2  0/11  1/4  0/3  1/3  0/0  1/1  3/22 
3  1/8  0/6  1/4  1/4  0/0  1/1  ,4/23 
4  1/6  0/8  1/2  0/4  011  1/1  3/22 
Period  5  0/8  1/8  1/3  1/4  22221/1  6/ 
6  0/7  4/10  n  21  23  1/3  1/1  8/25 
7  1/8  1/8  0/3  1/4  0/1  2/  5/2 
8  1/6  0/8  0/4  1/3  1/2  0/1  3/24 
9  0/5  2/9  GM  1/3  0/  1/1  4/2 
10  0/5  0/8  0/3  0/4  0/2  1/1  1/23 
ALL  4/75-  9/72  3/31  8/35  1 4/13  10/11_,  38/237_ 
FIGURE lb.-Middle  stakes (300 Sk). 
in period ten of the 60 Sk condition no offers were made in the 0-245 offer 
range  whereas  in the 450-495 offer range five offers were made but none were 
rejected.  Below each figure  are the number  of offers and rejections  for each cell. 
Figures la-lc  highlight  the main responder  results that formal analysis  will 
confirm.  First,  proportionally  smaller  offers are rejected  more often in all stakes 
conditions. Thus, in  order to  test  the  effect of  stakes on  rejections, it  is 
important  to control  for the proportional  size of offers. Second, the percent of 
offers rejected is smaller in higher stakes for each offer range less than 50% 
except in the 250-295 range. For example,  for all ten periods in the 450-495 HIGH  STAKES ULTIMATUM GAMES  577 
40%  2n501J3049 
1500  8k:  Rejections  / Offers 
Offer  Ra3  w  r  Rr  r.  r00...Z5  . 
____  495  -4  5  445  -295  -245 
1  01  1/7n  0-  0/0u  -  1/2  2/2_  4115 
2  0/4  0/0  0/  WI  -/1  1-/2Ws  1114 
4  011  0/7  0/2  0  1  _0/0  2/3  2/14 
Period  5  0/0  1/10  U11  0/1  112  112  3/10 
8  0/1  k  11  0/1  1/3  n  1/2  3/17 
7  01  7o__1'-Q8  0 _a  12  0/1  WI  3/3.  .._ 3/17 
;5  84  1  0  0  35U10  30  125  _  0  / 
6  0/1  1/7  0W8  112  0/4  012  2217  415 
10  0/0  0/9  0/1_  Oi4  O0  1/1  1/15 
ALL  0/15  4/61  013  2/18  -3/6  1220  21/155 
FIGURE  lC.-High  stakes  (1500  Sk). 
offer range,  9.6% (5/52)  of offers are rejected  in the 60 Sk condition,  whereas 
only 5.3% (4/75)  are rejected in the 300 Sk condition, and none (0/15)  are 
rejected in the 1500 Sk condition.  Third,  offers are, in general, rejected fairly 
equally across periods for most offer ranges. For example, in  the  300 Sk 
condition  in the 450-495 offer range, no offers are rejected in the first two or 
last two periods  and oneof fer is rejected in each of the third,  fourth,  seventh, 
and eighth  periods. 
To test responder  behavior,  we only investigate  offers of less than 50%. For 
offers of 50% (or more), we predict (on the basis of earlier experiments)  that 578  R.  SLONIM AND  A.  E.  ROTH 
virtually all offers will be accepted, regardless of pie size, and thus do not expect 
any difference due to stakes.'2 For offers less than 50%, responders may obtain 
utility not only from monetary payoffs, but also from punishing an unfair offer.'3 
Higher  stakes  may  decrease  rejections  if  the  monetary  reward  dominates 
punishment  value  at  higher  stakes  while  punishment  value  dominates  the 
monetary reward at lower stakes. (However, stakes may not have this effect if, as 
stakes increase, a responder's utility from punishing a proportionally small offer 
rises at least as much as his utility from money increases.) 
First Round Behavior: A  number  of  previous  studies  of  ultimatum  games 
compare  aggregate rejection  rates  for different  stakes.  In  the  present  experi- 
ment, for all disproportionate offers made in the first round, 21% (3/14),  5% 
(1/20),  and 27% (4/15)  were rejected by low, middle, and high stakes respon- 
ders, respectively. None  of the pairwise differences are significant.'4 This result 
is similar to previous ultimatum game results discussed above. One concern with 
this result is the power to detect differences due to sample size; recall, there are 
24, 33, and 25 responders in the three conditions and only 59.8% (49/82)  of the 
offers  in  the  first  period  are  less  than  50%.15  A  second  concern  is  that 
differences in proportions offered between conditions are ignored. For example, 
there are no offers less than 30% in the lowest stakes in the first round, whereas 
there are five offers less than 30% in the middle and high stakes, and 4 of these 
offers are rejected, constituting all but one of the rejections by middle and high 
stakes responders. Thus, looking at overall rejection rates may hide differences 
that exist among proportionally similar offers. 
To  control  for  proportionally equivalent  offers,  the  following  logit  models 
were investigated for first period rejection behavior: 
(1)  Reject =f(a  + boff  * off ), 
(2)  Reject = f (a + boff  * off + b,71  * pieM + b, * pieH), 
where  Reject equals  1 if the  offer  is rejected  and equals  0 otherwise,  f(x)= 
17(1 + e-x)  is the logit function, off  is the proportion of the pie offered (from 0 
to 49.5%), pieM = 1 if stakes are 300 Sk and 0 otherwise (which measures the 
12Table  I shows that for offers greater than or equal to 50%, the proportion of offers (about 1/3) 
and the number of offers rejected (1 or 2) are nearly identical across stakes. 
3See,  for example, Bolton (1991) and Bolton and Zwick (1995). 
14Two-tailed  test  of  proportion  results  are:  low  vs.  middle:  z=  1.46,  p = .143;  low  vs.  high: 
z =-0.33,  p > .70; middle vs. high: z =  -181,  p = .070. Note, the middle stakes responders rejected 
less often than the high stakes responders, counter to the expected direction. 
15Hoffman,  McCabe, and Smith (1996) had a similar sample size (24 and 27 subjects in $10 and 
$100 conditions) and similar results for a one shot game with random entitlement: 12.5% (3/24)  and 
18.5% (5/27)  of offers were rejected in their low and high stakes, respectively. HIGH  STAKES ULTIMATUM GAMES  579 
marginal change in rejections from the lowest to middle stakes) and pieH = 1 if 
stakes are 1500 and 0 otherwise. The first model  tests whether the proportion 
offered  influences  the  probability of  an  offer  being  rejected,  restricting the 
effect of stakes to have the same influence on rejections. Model 2 tests whether 
stakes influence rejections, controlling for the proportional offer. 
Table II reports logit regression results. Columns 1 and 2 report the results 
for models 1 and 2, respectively. Subgame perfection predicts all positive offers 
will be  accepted;  thus  the  null  hypothesis  is  b,ff = 0.  If  smaller proportional 
offers are rejected more often, then  b,ff < 0  (i.e., larger proportional offers are 
rejected less often).  In both models,  boff is significantly less  than 0, indicating 
smaller offers are more likely to be rejected (models  1 and 2, p <  .01). 
Model 2 tests the effect of stakes on rejections. If stakes have no influence on 
rejections, then  b,1  =bl  = 0. If higher stakes reduce the likelihood that an offer 
will be  rejected, then  b1,  < bi  < 0.  Model  2 results indicate that middle stakes 
responders are least  likely to reject an offer and lowest stakes responders are 
most  likely (bm,  =  -4.61  <  bh =  -  1.17 < 0). Although,  high  and middle stakes 
responders are directionally less likely to reject offers than low stakes respon- 
TABLE  II 
LOGIT REGRESSION  RESULTS:  PROBABILITY  OFFER IS REJECTED 
Rounid 1  All  Rounds 
Parameter  Model  1  Model  2  Model  3  Model  4  Model  5  Model  6 
Intercept  4.22  7.08  2.93  X  8  4.29  *  4.66  8 t  4.39> * 
boff  - 15.7**  -  20.3**  -15.8  '  17.6**  -17.5<*  - 17.7  T 
b,7,  -  4.61  -  0.73  -  0.69  -  0.78* 
(p=  .13)  (p  = .028)  (p  = .037)  (p  = .023) 
b,,  -  1.17  -  1.30"  -  1.29>  "  -  1.39  "'" 
(p  =.35)  (p  = .002)  (p  = .002)  (p  =.001) 
avr!sej  5.54**  5.29***  5.30  WX  5.49* 
bro  it d  -  0.07 
(p  =.156) 
b2,  *  * *  blo  1-t 
#  Observations  49  49  548  548  548  548 
-2  Log  Likelihood  30.08  23.95  336.28  325.15  323.12  311.04 
vs. model  1  vs. model  3  vs. model  4  vs. model  4 
Model  =  6.13  (2 =  11.13  X(2) =  2.03  X(2) =  14.1 
Comparisons:  (p  =  .046)  (p  =  .0038)  (p  = .154)  (p  <  .118) 
Notes:  1-parameter  estimates  for  round  dummy  variables  not  shown.  p  <  .05,  **p <  .01,  <**p <  .001. 580  R.  SLONIM AND  A.  E.  ROTH 
ders,  neither  condition  alone  is  significantly  different  from  the  low  stakes 
condition (middle stakes, p = .13; high stakes, p = .35).16 
In  summary, we  cannot  reject  that  increasing stakes  has  no  effect  on  the 
rejection rate in the first round. However, by looking at behavior across rounds, 
we can more powerfully investigate behavior for proportionally similar offers. 
Behavior Across Rounds: In offer ranges less than 50% shown in Table I and 
Figures la-1c,  the rejection rate monotonically decreases as the financial stakes 
increase in every range except the 250-295  range. For example, in the 350-395 
range, 40.7% (11/27),  9.7% (3/31),  and 0% (0/13)  of offers are rejected in the 
low, middle, and high conditions. In each of the four ranges in which there are 
at least  10 offers  in each  treatment, the  rejection rate is always lower in the 
higher stakes conditions. 
To test if rejections decrease as stakes increase, the following logit regressions 
were run: 
(3)  Reject =f(a  +  boff * off +  bav,rej  * avre]i), 
(4)  Reject = f(a  + boff* off + b,,1  * pieM+  b1l  * pieH+  bavl.ej  * avre]i), 
where off, pieM, and pieH are defined above. Avreii equals the average number 
of offers rejected by subject i, excluding the current offer.17  Avreji is included to 
capture individual rejection propensity differences, since multiple observations 
of  the  same  individual are not  independent.18 We  expect  bavrej >  0; the  more 
16The  model  2  X2  test  result  indicates  that  compared  to  the  restricted  model  1 with  bm =  bi, =  0, 
the  likelihood  that  an  offer  will  be  rejected  is  significantly  different  across  the  three  stakes 
conditions  (p  =  .046).  However,  since  model  2  parameter  estimates  indicate  that  middle  stakes 
responders  are  less  likely  than  high  stakes  responders  to  reject  an  offer,  we  cannot  conclude  that 
higher  stakes  cause  offers  to  be  rejected  more  often.  Combining  the  middle  and  high  stakes  (i.e., 
restricting  b,.  =  bl),  but  otherwise  using  a  model  identical  to  model  2,  higher  stakes  marginally 
decrease  the  likelihood  of  an  offer  being  rejected  (p  =  .09).  However,  we  have  no  a priori  reason  to 
combine  these  two  conditions  and  combining  the  lower  two  stakes  conditions  (i.e.,  restricting 
b,  =  0), but  otherwise  using  a model  identical  to  model  2, higher  stakes  (insignificantly)  increase  the 
likelihood  of  an  offer  being  rejected  (p  =.43).  In  other  words,  middle  stakes  responders  are  less 
likely  than  either  low  or  high  stakes  responders  to  reject  an  offer  in  period  1. Thus,  depending  on 
how  we  aggregate  the  three  stakes  conditions,  we  may  draw  different  conclusions.  When  we  analyze 
all  ten  rounds,  this  concern  disappears.  The  limited  number  of  disproportionate  offers  in  period  1 
stresses  the  importance  of  the  low  power  to  detect  differences.  This  low  power  using  just  one  period 
will  be  demonstrated  below. 
17For example,  responder  211  received  offers  less  than  500  in rounds  2, 4, 5, 6, and  8 and  rejected 
offers  in  rounds  4 and  5.  Avrej911 thus  equals  .50  (2/4)  in  rounds  2, 6,  and  8 and  equals  .25  (1/4)  in 
rounds  4  and  5. 
18Since  24,  33,  and  25  subjects  are  in the  three  respective  stakes  conditions,  the  sample  size  is too 
small  to  use  a random  effects  model  to  control  for  subject  effects.  Since  subjects  are  nested  within  a 
single  stakes  condition,  and  further,  since  38%  (9/24),  52%  (17/33),  and  56%  (14/25)  of  the 
subjects  in  the  respective  stakes  conditions  never  reject  an  offer,  a fixed  effects  model  to  control  for 
subject  effects  is inappropriate  (i.e.,  there  is no  variance  for  subjects  who  never  reject).  The  variable 
av7eji  is thus  used  as  a proxy  to  control  for  subject  effects. HIGH  STAKES ULTIMATUM GAMES  581 
often  subjects reject other  offers,  the  more  often  they will reject the  current 
offer. 
Column 3 and 4 of Table II report the results. Model 3 and 4 results indicate 
that  larger proportional  offers  decrease  the  likelihood  that  an  offer  will  be 
rejected (b,ff < 0, p <  .001) and the more often  responders reject other offers, 
the more often  they will reject the current offer (bat,,ej  > 0, p <  .001). Model 4 
tests  the  influence  of  stakes  on  rejections. The  results  indicate  that both  the 
middle and high stakes conditions decrease the likelihood that an offer will be 
rejected  relative  to  the  lowest  stakes  condition  (b,..=  -0.73,  p  =  .0280;  b1 = 
-  1.30, p = .0016)."9 
Figure 2  graphs the  effect  of  stakes  on  rejections  by proportional offer  as 
predicted by model  4.20  To  compare  the  predicted  to  observed behavior, the 
graph includes actual rejection rates for each offer range reported in Table I. 
The  model predicts that the  higher the  stakes, the  less  likely an offer will be 
rejected. The graph shows that the largest absolute difference between stakes in 
the likelihood  to reject occurs for moderately disproportionate offers and that 
the smallest absolute difference occurs for offers very close to an equal split and 
for extremely disproportionate offers. For example, an offer of 45% (close to an 
equal split) is predicted to be rejected 9.4% of the time by low stakes responders 
and 1.5% of the time by high stakes responders. Similarly, an offer of 5% (an 
extremely disproportionate offer) is predicted to be rejected 99.2% of the time 
by low stakes responders and 94.4% of the time by high stakes responders. The 
absolute  difference  is much wider for moderately disproportionate offers; for 
example, an offer of 25% is predicted to be rejected 77.8% of the time by low 
stakes responders but only 33.4% of the time by high stakes responders. 
To test whether rejection rates changed over time, we investigate two specifi- 
cations: 
Reject =f  (a + boff * off + b,,7  * pieM +  bh * pieH +  bct  ,rej  *  avrei 
+ b,o  it  n,d * round), 
(6)  Reject=  f (a  +  bo,ff * off  +  b,l  * pieM  +  b,l * pieH  +  ba  *ei  avueji 
+b1 * rl  +  ...  +b9 * r9). 
Model  5  investigates  whether  rejections  increase  or  decrease  over  time  by 
including the variable round; round equals 1 for round 1, equals 2 for round 2, 
19We  also tested whether the  effect  of offers on rejections depends on the stakes condition by 
including in model 4 the interaction terms offer by pieM and offer by pieH. The results of this test 
were  that  neither  interaction  term had any influence  on  rejections (p  > .90 for both  interaction 
terms), indicating that the effect of offers on rejections is independent of the stakes condition (and 
that the effect of stakes on rejections is independent of the offer). 
20 Figure 2 assumes the average rejection rate (aLtreji)  for a hypothetical responder is at the mean 
of all experimental responders for each condition: 25.6%, 16.0%, and 13.0% in the low, middle, and 
high stakes conditions, respectively (see Table I, offers  < 500). 582  R.  SLONIM AND  A.  E.  ROTH 
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FIGURE  2.-Rejection  predictions (from regession model 4). 
and  so  on.  Round  captures  monotonic  trends  in  rejection  rates  over  time.21 
Model  6  includes  dummy variables  for  each  round  to  investigate  whether 
rejection  rates  depend  on  particular rounds  (for  example,  the  first or  last), 
possibly  nonmonotonically.  The  results  of  both  specifications  indicate  that 
rounds have no effect  on rejection rates. In model 5, proportionally equivalent 
offers are less likely to be rejected over time (b round  =  -0.07),  but not signifi- 
cantly (p  = .16). In model 6, round dummy variables do not significantly increase 
the explanatory power of the model ( X(2)  =  14.1, p = .12). Two individual rounds 
21The  Roth-Erev  learning  model  predicts that  rejections will  slowly decrease  over  time; thus 
model 5 can be viewed as a test of whether experimental responders also reject less often over time. 
However, in the Roth-Erev model, rejection rates fell very slightly over ten rounds and thus it may 
be difficult to detect this small decrease. HIGH  STAKES ULTIMATUM GAMES  583 
were  significantly different  than  all  other  rounds; rejections  were  marginally 
higher in the  6th round (p  =  .062) and significantly lower in the  tenth  round 
(p  =.019).22  We  interpret  6th  round  behavior  as  likely  due  to  noise.  The 
significantly lower rejection rate in the last round may signify an end effect  or 
may also be noise. Thus, round has no systematic effect on rejections over time. 
Statistical  power: One question that naturally arises from the preceding analy- 
sis  is  why  no  significant  differences  in  rejection  frequencies  are  detected 
between  stakes in the first period (or in one-shot  experiments) whereas across 
all ten rounds we detect significantly fewer rejections in the higher stakes. One 
hypothesis  is  that  there  was  an  interaction  effect  in  which  rejection  rates 
decreased over time in higher stakes more than in the low stakes. We tested this 
hypothesis by including the interaction of round by middle stakes and round by 
high stakes  in  model  5.  However, neither  interaction  term has  any effect  on 
rejections (p  > .90 for both interactions), indicating that the effect of round on 
rejections is the same across stakes conditions; i.e., the relative difference in the 
frequency of rejections between stakes is constant across rounds.23 
Since  stakes  have  an overall  effect  on  rejections,  but  the  difference  is  not 
observed in the first period nor is it observed to change over time, the inability 
to detect a significant difference in the first period (or in one shot experiments) 
may be due to low power.24  The low power is likely caused by the fact that only 
small  differences  in  responder  behavior  occur  for  offers  near  an  equal  split 
(recall Figure 2 and that the  absolute  difference  between  low and high stakes 
responders  rejecting  an  offer  of  45%  is  less  than  10%) combined  with  the 
observation that the majority of offers are near the equal split (Table I reports 
that  over  75% (626/820)  of  all  offers  are  at  least  40%). Thus,  detecting  a 
difference in responder behavior requires many observations to detect the small 
differences for nearly equal offers or to generate enough very unequal offers for 
which the difference in responder behavior is large. 
To investigate the power to detect a significant difference, we generated 500 
simulated data sets based on the model 4 results in which high stakes responders 
are less likely to reject proportionally equivalent offers than low stakes respon- 
22To  test whether a round was distinct from all other rounds, ten separate regressions were run, 
each time including only one dummy variable for each round. 
23We  also ran models  1 and 2 for tenth period behavior in order to test whether stakes had a 
significant effect  on rejection frequencies  that may have developed after ten periods. However, no 
substantive  differences  between  the  model  results  for  the  first period  behavior  or  tenth  period 
behavior were  observed; in both  the  first and tenth  period lower offers significantly cause  higher 
rejection frequencies and stakes have no significant effect on rejections. Thus, the effect of stakes on 
rejections appears to be constant across rounds. 
24For  example, Hoffman et al. had 24 and 27 responders in their one  shot random entitlement 
ultimatum game, nearly identical in size  to our 24, 33, and 25 responders in the low, middle, and 
high stakes conditions-and  they observed 12% (3/24)  and 18.5% (5/27)  rejections in their low and 
high conditions, also similar to the 21%, 5%, and 27% we observed in the low to high conditions. 584  R.  SLONIM AND  A.  E.  ROTH 
TABLE III 
POWER  TEST  RESULTS 
Rotund 1  All  Rounds 
p-values  b,,1  bh  b,ffer  b,,1  bl,  baurei  b,ffer 
p  <  .10  15%  15%  92%  97%  100%  100%  100% 
p  <  .05  3%  2%  84%  90%  100%  100%  100% 
p  <.01  0%  0%  20%  52%  99%  100%  100% 
Notes:  The  percent  listed  in each  cell  represents  the  power  to  detect  a significant  difference  for  the  parameter  estimate 
listed  in the  column  header  at the  a  significance  level  listed  for  the  row. For  example,  the  power  to  detect  that  b,,  *  0  at 
the  10% significance  level  for  the  1 Period  Slovak  Sample  Size  is  15%. In  other  words,  if the  identical  experiment  is run 
agaiin, then  there  is a  15% likelihood  that  we  would  detect  a difference  between  the  rejection  rate  of  the  middle  and  low 
stakes  responders  in the  first period  at the  5%  significance  level. 
ders. We then analyzed each data set identically to the analysis presented above. 
To generate the simulated data sets, simulated offers are set equal to the actual 
Slovak  offers.  Responder  decisions  are  based  on  the  behavior  predicted  by 
model  4; given  an  offer  in  the  specific  stakes  treatment,  model  4  is  used  to 
determine the probability that the offer is rejected; then a random draw is used 
to  determine  if  the  offer  is  rejected.25 Table  III  presents  the  results  of  the 
analysis for the 500 data sets. 
The first three columns of Table III indicate how often, using only first period 
data,  we  can  detect  the  (known)  difference  between  stakes  generated  from 
model 4. The power is extremely low; the power to detect a difference at even 
the generous 10% significance level between the low and middle or the low and 
high stakes is only 15%. The power to detect differences at the 5% significance 
level is less than 5%. In other words, if the experiment is repeated many times, 
we would expect to detect the known difference less than one time in twenty at 
the 5% level. In contrast, the power to detect that offers affect rejections at the 
5%  level  is  84%. In  other  words, the  sample  size  is  sufficient  to  detect  the 
substantial effect  of offers on rejections using only first period data, but is not 
large enough to detect the more subtle effect of stakes on rejections. Thus, it is 
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25To  determine  the  rejection  probability for  a given  offer  and  stakes  condition,  model  4  also 
requires  an  average  rejection  rate  (avreji)  for  each  responder.  We  thus  gave  each  simulated 
responder in a given stakes condition one of the Slovak responder's average rejection rates for that 
condition. For example, since there were 9, 17, and 14 responders in the low, middle, and high stakes 
who never rejected an offer, we include 9, 17, and 14 simulated responders in the low, middle, and 
high stakes who have an average rejection rate of 0%. Finally, we matched simulated responders to 
simulated  proposers  identically  to  how  Slovak  responders  and  proposers  were  matched.  These 
procedures substantially reduce noise  in the power tests and avoid making additional distributional 
assumptions about  the  determination  of  both  offers  and responder rejection propensities.  Slonim 
(1997) investigated the power tests for a variety of distributional assumptions for both proposers and 
responders and found similar results to those presented below. HIGH  STAKES ULTIMATUM GAMES  585 
not  surprising that we  (and prior experiments using similar sample  sizes)  are 
unable to detect differences in rejection frequencies in the first period.26 
The last four columns of Table III report power test results when using all ten 
periods. The power to detect a difference at the 5% level between the low and 
middle stakes is now extremely high (90% power) and at the 5% level we always 
detect the difference between the low and high stakes (100% power). 
In summary, higher stakes responders are more likely to behave consistently 
with subgame perfect equilibrium in the sense  that they reject fewer offers for 
proportionally equivalent shares of  the  pie.  These  effects  are most  significant 
when  stakes  differ by a factor of  25  and are also  significant when  the  stakes 
differ by  a  factor  of  5.  Comparing these  results with  first round results  and 
results  from  previous  studies  (which  do  not  detect  differences  in  responder 
behavior) indicates the value of multiple observations per subject; in first round 
behavior and one-shot games significant differences are not detected. 
Though  responders  were  generally  more  willing  to  accept  proportionally 
smaller offers in higher stakes, it was not the  case  that proposers could make 
small offers with impunity; some responders rejected substantial monetary sums. 
For example, three out of 22 responders rejected a 40% offer in the high stakes 
condition one time, thus sacrificing 600 Sk (20 to 30 hours wages). Further, 9 out 
of 16 offers between 20 and 24.5% (300 to 370 Sk) were rejected. Hence, higher 
stakes decreased the willingness of responders to reject disproportionate offers, 
but did not cause behavior to be consistent with perfect equilibria even when it 
cost one or more days' wages. 
3.2.  Proposer  Behavior 
Higher  stakes  may induce  proposers to  make  lower offers  for  at  least  two 
reasons.  First, proposers  may obtain  utility from both  monetary rewards and 
fairness (Ochs  and Roth  (1989), Bolton  (1991)); at  lower stakes  fairness  may 
outweigh  monetary rewards but  at  higher stakes  monetary rewards may out- 
weigh  fairness. Second,  if  as observed, rejections  decrease  as stakes  increase, 
expected payoffs may be maximized at lower offers. (If proposers are risk averse, 
this latter implication may not hold.) 
To  investigate  the  effect  of  stakes  on  offers, we  do  not  analyze the  small 
group of  subjects who made a substantial number of  offers greater than 50% 
6 Prescriptively, we investigated what sample size is needed to achieve adequate power so that we 
could confidently expect to observe the difference in stakes predicted by model 4. We increased the 
sample size and found that not until a sample size of 5 times the Slovak sample size are we able to 
achieve at least 75% power to detect  a significant difference  at the 5% level between  the low and 
middle stakes conditions and not until a sample size of 4 times the Slovak sample size are we able to 
detect  a significant difference  at the 5% level between  the  low and high stakes conditions. Thus, 
increasing the  stakes  by a  factor  of  25,  one  would  need  approximately 100  responders  in  each 
condition to detect  a significant stakes effect  at the 5% level with 75% power when  analyzing first 
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since we do not study (nor propose a model for) this particular behavior.27 The 
data, after removing subjects who made at least four offers greater than 50%, 
contain no subject who made more than 2 offers above 50%. Note  that offers 
greater than 50% occurred almost equally in each stakes condition (about 7%) 
and  in  each  round; thus  removing  them  does  not  systematically influence  a 
particular round or stakes condition. We also exclude subject number 401 from 
the analysis. This subject's offer in all ten rounds was 5 (.5% of the pie), which 
was rejected in all but the eighth round.28 We exclude this subject because  his 
average offer was 3 standard deviations below the next lowest subject's average 
offer (220 by subject number 1003) and 5 standard deviations below the average 
offer  of  all  subjects'  average  offers.  The  exclusion  of  this  subject  has  no 
significant effect  on the results. After removing subjects who made more than 
two offers greater than 50% and one who always offered  .5%, there are 23, 29, 
and 23 subjects in the low, middle, and high conditions, respectively. 
Comparing first round  offers  across  stakes,  mean  (median)  offers  are  451 
(465), 460 (480), and 423 (450) in the  low, middle, and high stakes conditions. 
Although offers are lower in the highest stakes condition, pairwise comparisons 
cannot  reject  that  offers  are  the  same  across  stakes  (one-tailed  t  tests  and 
Wilcoxian, Median, and Kolmogorov-Smirnov nonparametric tests cannot reject 
no  difference;  p > .05 for  every pairwise comparison). This  inability to  reject 
that stakes do not influence offers is consistent with the results of Hoffman et 
al. (1996) and Cameron (1995). 
The  current design gives us the opportunity to test whether having multiple 
observations  per  subject may enable  us  to  detect  any significant differences. 
Figure 3a  shows average offers  over time.  Notice  that middle  and low stakes 
average offers  are  similar in  the  first two rounds and both  higher  than high 
stakes offers, but for the last six rounds middle and high stakes average offers 
are similar and both lower than low stakes offers. The middle stakes offers tend 
to decrease the most over time, while low stakes offers tend to neither increase 
nor decrease consistently over all ten rounds. 
Using offers across all rounds, the following analysis of variance was run: 
(7)  OFFER = PIE + ROUND + SUB(PIE)  + PIE * ROUND, 
27We removed proposers who made at least four offers greater than 50%. The result was that 1, 
3, and 2 proposers were removed from the  analysis in the low, middle, and high stakes conditions. 
All  remaining proposers made no  more than two offers greater than 50%. The  number of  offers 
above 50% that were removed was almost exactly 2/3  of the  total number of offers greater than 
50%  made  in  each  condition.  By  removing  these  subjects,  the  average  offer  removed  in  each 
condition was 550, 504, and 565 in the low, middle, and high stakes. Removal of these subjects does 
not affect the results in any significant way. The subjects removed were subjects number 301, 405, 
506, 810, 904, and 1004. (These subjects are included in the summary statistics in Table I (top row) 
and are in Appendix A.) 
28The rejection of .5% in all but the eighth period can be seen  in Figure lb  in the 0-245  offer 
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where  PIE  captures  the  three  stakes  levels,  ROUND  represents  the  (linear) 
amount of  experience  a player has (ROUND = 1 in round 1, etc.),  SUB(PIE) 
captures the  (dependent)  fixed subject effects,  noting that subjects are nested 
within a single PIE treatment, and PIE * ROUND captures any unique interac- 
tion between experience and stakes effects.29 
Table  IV  summarizes the  results and Figure 3b shows the  predicted offers 
from the  model.  There  is  a  significant interaction  between  stakes  and round 
between  the  middle  and  low  stakes  conditions  (F = 10.30,  p <  .01)  and  a 
marginally significant interaction between  stakes and round for the middle and 
high stakes conditions  (F = 2.94, p < .10). Middle stakes offers are decreasing 
more than either the low or high stakes conditions (Figure 3b shows this steeper 
slope). Because  of this interaction, we cannot investigate a main effect between 
the middle stakes and the other two conditions.30 However, comparing the high 
and low stakes conditions, where  no  interaction occurs, we  cannot  reject that 
high stakes offers are the same as low stakes offers (f=  1.14, p > .20). 
Although stakes have no main effect  on offers, offers decreased significantly 
more  in  the  middle  than  in  the  low  stakes.  We  now  explore  whether  the 
different learning patterns across treatments can be explained by initial differ- 
TABLE  IV 
ANOVA  RESULTS: 
PIE  SIZE  (STAKES)  AND  INTERACTION  OF PIE  AND  ROUND  EFFECTS  ON  OFFER 
Contrasts  PIE  PIE  :ROUND 
middle  vs.  low  F1.50 =  2.82,  p  <  .10  F1.50 =  10.30,  p  <  .01 
high vs. low  F144 = 1.14, p > .25  F1.44  =  2.00, p>  .15 
high vs. middle  F1.50  = 7.87, p < .01  F1.50  =  2.94, p <.10 
Notes: Analysis of  Variance Mode]: OFFER  = PIE + ROUND  + SUB(PIE) + PIE*ROUND. 
The  model  predicts,  for  the  average  proposer  within  each  treatmenit,  the  following: 
Pie = 60:  OFFER  = 440 + 0.07*ROUND, 
Pie = 300:  OFFER  = 453 -  5.16 ROUND, 
Pie =  1500:  OFFER  = 423 -  2.13IROUND, 
or 
OFFER  = 440 +.07*ROUND + 13  {PIE,,,  -  17"PIE1,  -  5.23*PIE,,*ROUND  -  2.13*PIEI,  ROUND. 
(p>  .25)  (p<  .01)  (p>  .15) 
29For  a  detailed  description  of  analysis of  variance,  see  Winer  (1971).  The  ANOVA  model 
assumes experience has a linear effect on offers. Although experience may have nonlinear effects on 
offers, we  found  no  significant differences  between  the  linear and several nonlinear  models. The 
linear model has out-of-sample concerns, such as suggesting that offers in high rounds (e.g., rounds 
greater than 1000) may be greater or less than the size of the pie. We limit our conclusions to the 
scope of the ten rounds of the experiment and do not extrapolate beyond them. 
30It is meaningless to talk about an overall difference between offers in the middle stakes and the 
other two conditions because the interaction signifies that the effect of stakes depends critically on 
the amount of experience. This result can be seen in Figures 3a or 3b where middle stakes offers are 
falling relative to low stakes offers; in early rounds middle and low stakes offers are similar, but in 
later rounds middle stakes offers are lower. 588  R.  SLONIM AND  A.  E.  ROTH 
3a: Actual  Offers  3b: Regression  Predictions 
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FIGURE 3a-3b.-Subjects  who made no more than two offers  >  50%. 
4a: Actual  Offers  4b: Regression  Predictions 
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FIGURE 4a-4b.-Subjects  whose round 1 offer is at least 350 (and who made no more than two 
offers  >  50%). 
5a: Actual  Offers  5b: Regression  Predictions 
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Notes: Figures  3a - 5b: Squares = 60 Sk, X's = 300 Sk and Circles = 1500 Sk 
FIGURE 5a-5b.-Subjects  whose round 1 offer is less than 350 (and who made no more than two 
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ences  across  stakes  among  proposers.  One  potentially  important  difference 
among inexperienced proposers is that no proposer in the low stakes made an 
offer below 35% of the pie  in the first round, whereas seven proposers in the 
higher two conditions made offers less than 35%. One hypothesis is that these 
initial  differences  rather than  differences  among  responders  could  cause  the 
different learning patterns. 
Figures 4a and 5a separate the behavior of proposers who in round 1 made an 
offer of  at least  35% (4a) from those who made  an offer less  than 35% (5a). 
Figures 4b and 5b plot regression results (model  7) for these  offers. Figure 4b 
shows that average offers in the higher two stakes conditions fall over time while 
there is no change in offers in the low stakes condition when round 1 offers are 
at least  35%. The  interaction between  round and pie  size is highly significant 
(F > 15, p < .0001 for both  middle vs. low and high vs. low comparisons) and 
there  is  no  difference  between  the  two  higher  stakes  conditions  (F = 0.14, 
p > .40). Thus, when  proposers initially made  similar offers  across stakes (de- 
fined here as offers of at least 35% in the first round), higher stakes proposers 
decreased  their  offers  more  than  low  stakes  proposers, indicating that  initial 
differences  among  proposers  cannot  explain  the  different  observed  learning 
patterns. 
Figures  5a  and  5b  show  that  high  stakes  proposers  who  initially  make 
relatively  small  offers  increase  their  offers  compared  to  middle  stakes 
proposers.31  Comparing Figures 3b, 4b, and 5b, the few proposers who increased 
their average offers in the highest stakes condition (Figure 5b) explain why the 
overall average offers  in the  highest  stakes  do  not  decrease  much; these  few 
proposers in early rounds bring down and in later rounds bring up the average 
offer  of  all  high  stakes  proposers.  In  the  middle  stakes  condition,  however, 
proposers who  initially made  low  offers  (less  than  35%) continued  to  make 
relatively  low  offers  (less  than  35%)  and  hence  did  not  retard  the  overall 
average offer from falling over time. 
4.  LEARNING 
The  current results indicate  that  offers  by inexperienced  subjects are  alike 
across  stakes,  but  become  different  with  experience.  This  is  similar  to  that 
observed by Roth  et  al. (1991) in comparing different subject pools. The  Roth 
and Erev (1995) reinforcement learning model was successfully used to predict 
the  different learning behavior observed in those  experiments. If the  learning 
model  can  also predict the  different  learning behavior in the  different  stakes 
conditions in the current experiment, then one question the learning model can 
address is whether the initial differences in proposer behavior or the differences 
31Since  only 7 subjects made offers less than 35% in period 1 in the higher two stakes conditions, 
statistical analysis of their offers is omitted. 590  R.  SLONIM AND  A.  E.  ROTH 
in  responder  behavior  can  explain  the  different  learning  patterns  across  the 
stakes treatments. 
The reinforcement learning model assumes each player has an initial propen- 
sity to play each of a finite number of pure strategies (see  Roth and Erev for a 
full  description  of  the  model).  The  propensity to  play each  pure  strategy is 
updated (reinforced) each time the strategy is played, by adding the  monetary 
payoff just  earned  to  the  current  propensity to  play  the  strategy. For  each 
subject, the  probability of playing a strategy equals the  propensity to  play the 
strategy divided by the sum of the propensities of all the strategies. The learning 
model  is investigated by having simulated proposers and responders play each 
other in a simulation of the experimental environment. For brevity we omit the 
details of the simulations we have run of the current experiment. 
We  used the behavior of  experimental proposers and responders within the 
first two rounds of each treatment to generate initial propensities for simulated 
proposers and responders.32 With these  initial propensities,  5,000  simulations 
were  run for each  treatment. Although  simulated offers  changed more slowly 
than experimental offers, the direction of learning for each treatment was the 
same for simulated and experimental offers. Consistent with the  experimental 
results,  simulated  middle  stakes  offers  decreased  most,  highest  stakes  offers 
decreased second most, and lowest stakes offers decreased least. 
We  next explored whether the  different learning patterns across treatments 
can be explained by initial differences across stakes among proposers or by the 
lower likelihood of rejection in higher stakes among responders. The simulation 
results  show  that  no  matter  what  the  initial  propensities  of  proposers,  the 
change  in  offers  over  time  depends  critically on  the  responders  they  played 
against. If proposers play against lower stakes responders, offers fall the  least 
(increase  the  most)  relative  to  playing against  either  middle  or  high  stakes 
responders. The learning model thus suggests that the different learning behav- 
ior observed is the  result of  the  lower rejection rates observed in the  higher 
stakes; all simulated proposers learn to lower offers when playing against middle 
and high stakes responders while they all learn to increase offers when playing 
against low stakes responders.33 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
Our experimental results for both the market and ultimatum games support 
the conclusion that, both when observed behavior conforms to perfect equilib- 
rium predictions and when it does not, behavior of inexperienced players may be 
robust to large increases in rewards. Our ultimatum game results confirm prior 
experimental  results  in  this  regard, while  in  other  respects  they  considerably 
extend what has previously been observed. 
32 Roth and Erev (1995) describe the process used to determine initial propensities. See also Erev 
and Roth (1998). 
33The  learning model results are reported in Slonim and Roth (1996). HIGH  STAKES ULTIMATUM GAMES  591 
As discussed earlier, a number of experiments have now established the fact 
that single-play ultimatum game behavior is quite robust, and does not approach 
the  perfect  equilibrium predictions  (for  either  player) even  when  stakes  are 
quite high. Perhaps the most compelling of these is the experiment of Cameron 
(1995), which detected  no change in behavior even  in the  face  of  a change in 
stakes by a factor of 40. Our results are quite consistent with this: in round 1, 
behavior in all three of our treatments is quite similar, and far from the perfect 
equilibrium predictions. 
Of  course  the  failure  to  detect  statistically significant differences  does  not 
mean  that not  even  small differences  exist. Variables like rejection frequency 
present a particularly difficult case,  since  only the  smaller observed offers are 
rejected with high frequency, and such offers are rare, so that trying to detect 
differences in first-round rejection rates would require impractically large sam- 
ples.  The  learning model  of  Roth  and Erev (1995)  predicts that  small initial 
differences in rejection frequencies should be reflected in increasingly different 
proposals  as  players have  an  opportunity to  learn  about  the  game,  and  the 
experiment reported here was designed to explore this prediction. 
Two  differences  in  the  ultimatum  game  behavior were  detected  as  stakes 
increased. First, responders (pooled  over all rounds) rejected offers less often. 
Second, there was an interaction effect  between  stakes and experience: in the 
higher stakes conditions the offers decreased with experience. The experiment 
and  learning  simulations  suggest  that  small  initial  differences  in  proposer 
behavior  cannot  account  for  the  differential  learning  behavior, but  that  the 
lower likelihood  of being rejected in the  higher stakes can account for higher 
stakes proposers learning to make lower offers. 
Notice that the different patterns of learning we observe among proposers in 
the different stakes conditions of the experiment, and the hypothesis about its 
origin in the different rejection frequencies which the learning model provides, 
tell us something about rejection frequencies which the simple statistical analy- 
sis cannot. Not  only are the  differences  in rejection frequencies  across stakes 
statistically significant, apparently they are also behaviorally important. 
In  general,  new  kinds  of  theory  allow  us  to  explore  different  kinds  of 
questions,  and suggest different kinds of  experiments. We  therefore  view this 
paper not only as an experiment designed to explore the effects of large changes 
in stakes, but also as an attempt to take seriously the demands that theories of 
learning place on (and the opportunities they provide for) experimental design 
and analysis. 
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